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Abstract
Deep neural nets achieve state-of-the-art performance
on the problem of optical flow estimation. Since optical
flow is used in several safety-critical applications like self-
driving cars, it is important to gain insights into the robust-
ness of those techniques. Recently, it has been shown that
adversarial attacks easily fool deep neural networks to mis-
classify objects. The robustness of optical flow networks to
adversarial attacks, however, has not been studied so far.
In this paper, we extend adversarial patch attacks to optical
flow networks and show that such attacks can compromise
their performance. We show that corrupting a small patch
of less than 1% of the image size can significantly affect op-
tical flow estimates. Our attacks lead to noisy flow estimates
that extend significantly beyond the region of the attack, in
many cases even completely erasing the motion of objects
in the scene. While networks using an encoder-decoder ar-
chitecture are very sensitive to these attacks, we found that
networks using a spatial pyramid architecture are less af-
fected. We analyse the success and failure of attacking both
architectures by visualizing their feature maps and compar-
ing them to classical optical flow techniques which are ro-
bust to these attacks. We also demonstrate that such attacks
are practical by placing a printed pattern into real scenes.
1. Introduction
Optical flow refers to the apparent 2D motion of each
pixel in an image sequence. It is denoted by a vector
field (u, v) that corresponds to the displacement of each
pixel in the image plane. The classical formulation [12]
seeks the optical flow (u, v) between two consecutive im-
ages I(x, y, t) and I(x+ u, y + v, t+ 1) in a sequence that
minimizes the brightness constancy (i.e. photometric) error
at each pixel, ρ(I(x, y, t)−I(x+u, y+v, t+1)), for some
robust function ρ, subject to spatial coherence constraints
that regularize the solution [4].
The estimation of flow from pairs of images has a long
Figure 1. Overview. The first column shows the optical flow re-
sults using an encoder-decoder architecture, FlowNetC [8], a spa-
tial pyramid architecture, SpyNet [20], and a classical method,
LDOF [6]. In the second column, a small circular patch is added
to both frames at the same location and orientation (highlighted
by the red box for illustration purposes). SpyNet and LDOF are
barely affected by the patch. In contrast, FlowNetC is strongly
affected, even in regions far away from the patch.
history [12] and is used in many applications spanning
medicine, special effects, video analysis, action recognition,
navigation, and robotics to name a few. A large number of
methods [3] have approached the problem and steadily im-
proved the results on current benchmarks [7, 10]. How-
ever, classical optical flow methods typically require ex-
tensive hand engineering [26] and computationally inten-
sive optimization. Recent methods [8, 13, 20] have there-
fore approached optical flow estimation using deep neural
networks. These methods typically run in real time and
produce results that are competitive with, or even surpass,
classical optimization-based approaches. Given the perfor-
mance of recent optical flow networks, they could become
an important component in applications such as self-driving
cars. The safety issues surrounding many of these systems
implies that the robustness of the algorithms must be well
understood. To date, there has not been any study to mea-
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sure the robustness of these networks to adversarial attacks.
Adversarial attacks on neural networks have been
shown to work on image classification networks [18]
and, consequently, it is reasonable to ask how such at-
tacks can affect optical flow networks. Consider the
optical flow (u, v) between two frames of an image
pair (It, It+1) computed using a network F such that
(u, v) = F (It, It+1). A successful adversarial at-
tack would cause large changes in estimated optical
flow for small, unnoticeable, perturbations in the im-
ages. Specifically, the adversary seeks a perturbed image
pair (I˜t, I˜t+1) such that ‖It − I˜t‖0 + ‖It+1 − I˜t+1‖0 < ,
where  is a small constant, and the estimated opti-
cal flow on the perturbed images is significantly worse,
||F (It, It+1)− F (I˜t, I˜t+1)|| > E, with a large constant E.
We are particularly interested in perturbations under the `0
norm, since the objective is to perturb a very small number
of pixels in the original image.
In general, the perturbations on the image can be defined
in several ways [11, 18, 25, 29]. Here, we focus on ap-
plying perturbations by pasting a small patch on the image
motivated by Brown et al. [5], who use such an approach
to carry out targeted adversarial attacks on image classifi-
cation. The patch attack has real-world significance and
we show that adversarial patches can compromise optical
flow networks if an engineered patch is printed and placed
in real-world scenes.
Optical flow networks can be classified into two types of
architectures – the encoder-decoder [8, 13] and spatial pyra-
mid networks [20, 28]. We contrast the robustness of adver-
sarial attacks under these two architecture types. Similar
to [5], we independently and jointly learn patches to attack
all networks. The learned patches compromise the encoder-
decoder architectures while spatial pyramid networks show
more robust behaviour as shown in Figure 1.
In the automotive scenario, cameras for autonomous
driving are often behind the windscreen. Patch attacks can
potentially be accomplished by placing the patch on the
windshield of the car or placing it in the scene (e.g. on a traf-
fic sign or other vehicle). Note that when the patch has zero
motion w.r.t. the camera, classical optical flow algorithms
estimate zero optical flow over the patch (LDOF in Fig. 1).
However, this engineered patch, even if it has no motion,
can cause the optical flow predictions from encoder-decoder
architectures to be wildly wrong (FlowNetC in Fig. 1). In
such a scenario, the patch affects the estimated optical flow
over large areas in the image that are far away from the
patch. The patch in Figure 1 is 0.53% the size of the im-
age and is barely noticeable, yet it affects the flow in about
50% of the image region.
For the encoder-decoder networks, the patches not only
influence the optical flow estimates in the area of the patch,
but their influence extends to remote areas in the image. In
spatial pyramid architectures, in contrast, the patch causes
at most small degradations in the area of the patch. Classi-
cal approaches [6, 23] are even more robust to adversarial
patches. We propose a Zero-Flow test (Section 5) to anal-
yse the causes of patch attacks, where we visualize the fea-
ture maps of the networks while attacking a uniform random
noise image without motion. Thereby, we identify three ma-
jor problems of optical flow architectures. 1) Flow networks
are not spatially invariant, leading to spatially varying fea-
ture maps even without any motion. 2) Spatial pyramid net-
works produce large errors at coarse resolutions but are able
to recover. 3) Deconvolution layers lead to strong amplifi-
cation of activations and checkerboard artifacts.
Our contributions are as follows. We extend adversarial
patch attacks to optical flow neural networks. We learn ad-
versarial patches and show that these attacks can consider-
ably affect the performance of optical flow networks based
on an encoder-decoder architecture. We show that spa-
tial pyramid architectures, along with classical optical flow
methods, are more robust to patch attacks. We show that
such attacks are easy to implement in practice by simply
printing the patch and placing it in the scene. We also anal-
yse the feature maps of these networks under attack to pro-
vide insight into their behaviour under attack. Code is avail-
able at http://flowattack.is.tue.mpg.de/.
2. Related Work
Optical Flow. The classical version of the optical flow
problem involves solving for a flow field that minimizes
the brightness constancy loss. A survey of classical opti-
cal flow methods is available in [3, 27]. These classical
methods solve a complex, non-convex, optimization prob-
lem and are often slow. Recent deep learning methods
replace the optimization process, and instead directly pre-
dict optical flow using convolutional networks [8, 13, 20].
FlowNet [8] is the first work to regress optical flow by learn-
ing an end-to-end deep neural network. FlowNet is based on
an encoder-decoder architecture with skip connections. Al-
though FlowNet is much faster than classical methods [26],
it is not as accurate. More recently, Ilg et al. [13] proposed
FlowNet2, which achieves state-of-the-art performance on
optical flow benchmarks. FlowNet2 is constructed by stack-
ing multiple FlowNets together and fusing the output with
a network specialized on small motions.
In contrast, motivated by the classical coarse-to-fine
methods, SpyNet [20] splits the matching problem into sim-
pler subproblems using coarse-to-fine estimation on an im-
age pyramid. PWC-Net [28] extends this idea with a corre-
lation layer to learn optical flow prediction; this gives state-
of-the-art results on optical flow benchmarks.
Still other methods approach this problem from the un-
supervised learning perspective [17, 31, 15, 21] by using
a neural network to minimize the photometric error un-
der certain constraints. These methods use both encoder-
decoder architectures [17, 31] and spatial pyramid architec-
tures [15].
While deep networks show impressive results on bench-
mark datasets, their robustness is not yet well understood.
Robustness, however, is critical for applications such as au-
tonomous driving. Therefore, we investigate the robustness
of representative approaches of each category in this paper.
In particular, we test FlowNet [8], FlowNet2 [13], SpyNet
[20], PWC-Net [28], and Back2Future [15] for their robust-
ness against adversarial attacks.
Adversarial Attacks. Adversarial attacks seek small
perturbations of the input causing large errors in the estima-
tion by a deep neural network. Attacking neural networks
using adversarial examples is a popular way to examine the
reliability of networks for image classification [11, 18, 29].
The key to all such attacks is that the change to the image
should be minor, yet have a large influence on the output.
Adversarial examples typically involve small perturbations
to the image that are not noticeable to the human eye. The
adversaries are shown to work even when a single pixel is
perturbed in the image [25].
Although these attacks reveal limitations of deep net-
works, they can not be easily replicated in real-world set-
tings. For instance, it is rather difficult to change a scene
such that one pixel captured by a camera is perturbed in
a specific way to fool the network. However, recent work
[16] demonstrates that adversarial examples can also work
when printed out and shown to the network under different
illumination conditions. Athalye et al. [2] show that ad-
versarial examples can be 3D printed and are misclassified
by networks at different scales and orientations. Sharif et
al. [24] construct adversarial glasses to fool facial recogni-
tion systems. Etimov et al. [9] show that stop signs can be
misclassified by placing various stickers on top of them.
Recently proposed patch attacks [5] place a small engi-
neered patch in the scene to fool the network into making
wrong decisions. Patch attacks are interesting because they
can be easily replicated in the real world, and work at sev-
eral scales and orientations of the patch. This makes deep
networks vulnerable in real world applications. Therefore,
we focus our investigation of the robustness of deep flow
networks on these kinds of attacks.
To our knowledge, there has been no work on attack-
ing optical flow networks. Consequently, we explore how
such networks can be attacked using adversarial patches and
analyse the potential causes of such vulnerabilities.
3. Approach
Adversarial attacks are carried out by optimizing for a
perturbation that forces a network to output the wrong labels
compared with ground truth labels. For example, if (u, v)
represents the ground truth labels for inputs (It, It+1), a
perturbed input (I˜t, I˜t+1) would produce incorrect labels
(u˜, v˜). However, there are no optical flow datasets that have
dense optical flow ground truth labels for natural images.
Most of the optical flow datasets are synthetic [7, 8, 22].
SlowFlow [14] provides real world data but is limited in
size. The KITTI dataset [10] has sparse ground truth labels
and the annotations are limited to 200 training examples. To
address the problem of limited ground truth labels, we use
the predictions of the optical flow network as pseudo ground
truth. We optimize for the perturbation that maximizes the
angle between the predicted flow vectors obtained using the
original images and the perturbed images respectively. Us-
ing the predictions instead of ground truth has the advantage
that a patch can be optimized using any unlabelled video.
This makes it easier to attack optical flow systems even in
the absense of the ground truth.
Consider an optical flow network F that computes the
optical flow between two-frames of an image sequence
(It, It+1) of resolution H × W . Consider a small patch
p of resolution h × w that is pasted onto the image to per-
turb it. Let δ ∈ T be a transformation that can be applied
to the patch. These transformations in T can be a combi-
nation of rotations and scaling. We define the perturbation
A(I, p, δ, l) on the image I , that applies the transformations
δ to the patch p and pastes it at a location l ∈ L in the im-
age. We apply the same perturbation to both frames in the
sequence I˜t = A(It, p, δ, l) and I˜t+1 = A(It+1, p, δ, l).
This means that the optical flow between the perturbed
frames is zero in the region containing the patch. In the
real world, this would correspond to a patch being station-
ary with respect to the camera. In our experiments, we
show that patches obtained with this assumption general-
ize well to the realistic scenario of moving patches where
I˜t = A(It, p, δt, lt) and I˜t+1 = A(It+1, p, δt+1, lt+1) with
δt 6= δt+1 and lt 6= lt+1.
Our goal is to learn a patch p that acts as an adversary to
an optical flow network, F , and is invariant to location l or
transformations δ of the patch. The resulting patch can be
optimized using
pˆ = argmin
p
E(It,It+1)∼I,l∼L,δ∼T
(u, v) · (u˜, v˜)
‖(u, v)‖ · ‖(u˜, v˜)‖ (1)
with
(u, v) = F (It, It+1) (2)
(u˜, v˜) = F (A(It, p, δ, l), A(It+1, p, δ, l)) (3)
where l is sampled over all the locations L in the image, and
I is a set of 2 frame sequences from a video.
Equation (1) computes the cosine of the angle between
the optical flow estimated by the network for normal and
perturbed images. Therefore, minimizing the loss is equiv-
alent to finding those adversarial examples that reverse the
direction of optical flow estimated by the network.
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Figure 2. Adversarial Patches. Obtained for different optical flow
networks. The size is enlarged for visualization purposes.
Table 1. Optical Flow Methods. Contrasting different optical
flow methods with respect to the Type, Supervision (Super.), Net-
work Architecture (Net.) - Encoder-Decoder (ED) vs. Spatial
Pyramid (SP) - and Number of Parameters (#Params.). Number
of parameters is denoted in Millions (M).
Type Super. Net. # Params
FlowNetC [8] CNN Yes ED 39 M
FlowNet2 [13] CNN Yes ED 162 M
SpyNet [20] CNN Yes SP 1.2 M
PWC-Net [28] CNN Yes SP 8.75 M
Back2Future [15] CNN No SP 12.2 M
LDOF [6] Classic - - -
Epic Flow [23] Classic - - -
4. Experiments
We evaluate the robustness of five optical networks to
adversarial patch attacks – FlowNetC [8], FlowNet2 [13],
SpyNet [20], PWC-Net [28] and Back2Future [15]. We
also evaluate the robustness of two very different classical
methods – LDOF [6] and EpicFlow [23] which take im-
age derivatives (LDOF) and sparse matches (EpicFlow) to
compute optical flow. These methods cover deep networks
vs. classical methods, supervised vs. unsupervised learning
methods and encoder-decoder vs. spatial pyramid architec-
tures, thus providing an overall picture of optical flow meth-
ods under adversarial patch attacks. We contrast these op-
tical flow methods in Table 1. First, we evaluate the effect
of White-box attacks, where we learn a patch of a specific
size for each network by optimizing over that particular net-
work. We then show Black-box attacks by creating a uni-
versal patch using two different networks and testing all the
optical flow methods on this patch in a real world scenario.
4.1. White-box Attacks
We perform White-box attacks on each of the networks
independently. We learn a circular patch that is invariant
to its location in the image, scale and orientation. The
scale augmentations of the patch are kept within ±5% of
the original size, and rotations are varied within ±10◦. For
each network, we learn patches of four different sizes. The
patch size is kept under 5% the size of the images being
attacked. We optimize for each patch p using Eq. (1) on
unlabeled frames from the raw KITTI [10]. We choose the
KITTI dataset since it reflects a safety critical application
and provides an annotated training set for evaluation. We
use the optical flow predictions from the networks as pseudo
ground truth labels to optimize for the patch that produces
the highest angular error. This allows us to leverage approx-
imately 32000 frames instead of 200 annotated frames from
the training dataset. For each of the networks, we use the
pre-trained model that gives the best performance without
fine tuning on KITTI dataset. We use Pytorch [1] as our
optimization framework and optimize for the patch using
stochastic gradient descent. Figure 2 shows the patches we
obtain by optimizing over different optical flow networks
and different patch sizes.
Evaluation. To quantify the robustness of the networks to
our adversarial patch attacks, we measure their performance
on the training set of the KITTI 2015 optical flow bench-
mark using the original and perturbed images, respectively.
We measure the vulnerability of the optical flow networks
using average end point error (EPE) and relative degrada-
tion of EPE in the presence of the adversarial patch (Ta-
ble 2). The errors are computed by placing the learned patch
p at a random location for each image in the training set. All
images are resized to 384×1280 and input to the networks.
We evaluate optical flow at the full image resolution.
As shown in Table 2, the performance of encoder-
decoder architectures – FlowNetC and FlowNet2 degrades
significantly, even when using very small patches (0.1% of
the image size). The increase in error is about 400− 500%
under attack. For the spatial pyramid based methods –
SpyNet, PWC-Net and Back2Future, the degradation is
small. Back2Future, which is an unsupervised method and
shares a similar architecture with PWC-Net, suffers less
Table 2. White-box Attacks. Effect of patch size (in pixel and percent of the image size) on different optical flow networks. We show
average End Point Error (EPE) on KITTI 2015 for each network with and without an attack. For attacks, we also show relative degradation
% in the EPE.
Unattacked 25x25 (0.1%) 51x51 (0.5%) 102x102 (2.1%) 153x153 (4.8%)
Network EPE EPE Rel EPE Rel EPE Rel EPE Rel
FlowNetC [8] 14.56 29.07 +100% 40.27 +177% 82.41 +466% 95.32 +555%
FlowNet2 [13] 11.90 17.04 +43% 24.42 +105% 38.57 +224% 59.58 +400%
SpyNet [20] 20.26 20.59 +2% 21.00 +4% 21.22 +5% 21.00 +4%
PWC-Net [28] 11.03 11.37 +3% 11.50 +4% 11.86 +7% 12.52 +13%
Back2Future [15] 17.49 18.04 +3% 18.24 +4% 18.73 +7% 18.43 +5%
Table 3. Black-box Attacks. Attacks on different optical flow
methods using a universal patch. Methods below the line were
not used for training the patch.
Unattacked Attacked
EPE EPE Rel
FlowNet2 [13] 11.90 36.13 +203 %
PWC-Net [28] 11.03 11.01 +0 %
FlowNetC [8] 14.56 86.12 +492 %
SpyNet [20] 20.26 20.39 +1 %
Back2Future [15] 17.49 17.44 +0 %
Epic Flow [23] 4.52 4.66 +3 %
LDOF [6] 9.20 9.17 +0 %
degradation than PWC-Net on the largest patch size.
In Figure 3, we illustrate that encoder-decoder architec-
tures are extremely vulnerable to patch attacks irrespective
of scene content, location and orientation of the patch. The
patch size in Figure 3 is 25× 25 pixels, about 0.12% of the
size of the image being attacked. The figure shows that the
attacks extend significantly beyond the region of the patch,
causing a significant proportion of the optical flow vectors
to be degraded. We also observe that SpyNet is least af-
fected by the attack. For PWC-Net and Back2Future, the
degradation is contained within the region of the patch. The
strength of the attack increases with the size of the patch.
Figure 4 shows attacks with a larger patch size of 153×153,
which is about 4.76% of the image size. Other examples
and patch sizes are shown in the supplementary material.
4.2. Black-box Attacks
In a real world scenario, the network used by a system
like an autonomous car will most likely not be accessible to
optimize the adversarial patch. Therefore, we also consider
a Black-box attack, which learns a “universal” patch to at-
tack a group of networks. Since there are two architecture
types (Encoder-Decoder and Spatial Pyramid), we consider
one network from each type to learn a “universal” patch to
attack all networks. We pick the networks – FlowNet2 [13]
and PWC-Net [28] and jointly optimize for a patch that at-
tacks both networks using Eq. 1. In this way, we obtain a
patch that is capable of attacking both encoder-decoder and
spatial pyramid architectures. The resulting patch can be
seen in Figure 7 and the Sup. Mat. While we focus on two
networks for a proof of concept, the “universal” patch can
easily be jointly optimized using more networks to obtain
even more effective attacks.
The training of the universal patch is identical to the
White-box case. However, we decided to make the eval-
uation of the Black-box attacks more realistic by using the
camera motion and disparity ground truth provided by the
KITTI Raw dataset to compute realistic motion of patches
assuming they are part of the static scene. We project the
random location of the patch from the first frame into the
3D scene and re-project it into the second frame consider-
ing the camera motion and disparity. We randomly pick a
disparity between the maximal disparity of the whole scene
and minimal disparity in region of the patch to obtain a loca-
tion in the free space between the camera and other objects
in the scene. Given the re-projection of points on the patch,
we then estimate a homography to transform the patch and
warp it using bilinear interpolation. For sequences without
ground truth camera poses we use zero motion like in the
White-box attacks. In this way, we simulate the situation
where a patch is attached to some static object in the scene.
In the supplementary material, we also show the effect of a
universal patch that has zero motion w.r.t the camera as in
the White-box attacks.
Evaluation. Table 3 shows the performance of all net-
works and classical optical flow methods from Table 1 in
the presence of the Black-box adversary. Consistent with
White-box attacks, we observe that encoder-decoder archi-
tectures suffer significantly in the presence of the adversar-
ial patch. Both, spatial pyramid architectures and classical
methods, are more robust to patch attacks.
We observe that the attacks on encoder-decoder net-
works are most effective when the patch is placed in the
the center of the image. The patches influence image re-
gions according to the receptive field of the convolutional
networks. Although the patches are small (∼ 0.5%) com-
pared to the image size, they can affect up to 50% of the
image area as can be observed in Figure 5. We show more
qualitative results in the supplementary material.
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Figure 3. White-box Attacks. 25x25 patch attacks on all networks.
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Figure 4. White-box Attacks. 153x153 patch attacks on all networks.
4.3. Real World Attacks
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of adversarial
patches in the real world, we print the Black-box patch
at 1200 dpi, scaled to 8 times the original size in the
image. We then place the patch in the scene, record a
video sequence, and observe the effects on two networks
- FlowNetC and FlowNet2. Figure 7 shows the effect of
the printed patch on a deployed optical flow system running
FlowNetC. While the location of the patch in the scene was
constant, we experiment with and without camera motion.
We observe that the real world attacks on FlowNetC work
equally well with and without camera motion, while attacks
on FlowNet2 worked better with camera motion. For the
video demo of this experiment, please follow this link –
http://flowattack.is.tue.mpg.de/.
5. Zero-Flow Test
To better understand the behaviour of neural networks in
the presence of an adversarial patch attack, we propose the
Zero-Flow test. We generate an image I by independently
sampling uniform random noise for each of the pixels. We
then paste the universal patch p on I , resulting in a per-
turbed image I˜ . We then replicate the image I˜ and input the
two frames to the network. Since the image is replicated for
both frames, the optical flow is zero over all the pixels.
Assuming that the attack was ineffective, F (I˜ , I˜) = 0
must hold. Furthermore, if perturbation is not applied to the
network inputs, F (I, I) = 0 must hold. For feature maps of
the network, Fk(I˜ , I˜) = Fk(I, I)must hold. Here, Fk is the
output from the k-th layer of the neural network. In Figure
6, we show feature map visualizations along with their aver-
age norm from two networks, FlowNetC and PWC-Net. For
each network we show the feature maps with and without
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Figure 5. Black-box Attacks. Universal patch trained on FlowNet2 and PWC-Net used on all approaches pasted on a traffic sign with
realistic motion as described in Section 4.2.
the patch. Each feature map is normalized independently
for contrast and scaled to the same size.
Figure 6 illustrates that the encoder of FlowNetC
(conv<3 1,4,5,6>) spatially propagates the patch in-
formation, as expected, and the feature activation encom-
passes the entire image towards the end of the encoder
(conv6). While deconvolutions (deconv<4,5,6>)
reduce the spatial propagation of activations, they also lead
to a strong amplification. Finally, the flow prediction lay-
ers (flow<5,4,3,2>) combine both problems by fus-
ing the encoder and decoder responses. This leads to large
and widespread degradation of optical flow predictions for
the Zero-Flow test. Without the adversarial patch, we ob-
serve well distributed activations in the first convolutions as
well as low activations for all layers in general.
PWC-Net shows low activations in all correlation lay-
ers (corr<6,5,4,3,2>) irrespective of the adversar-
ial patch. Interestingly, the flow decoder of lower levels
(flow<6,5>) predict large flow in both cases – with and
without patch. However, the flow prediction at finer lev-
els of the pyramid (flow<3,2>) seems to compensate
for these errors. Similar to FlowNetC, the deconvolution
layers (upfeat<5,4,3>) lead to an amplification of ac-
tivations, with and without the patch. In addition, they seem
to cause checkerboard artifacts that have also been observed
in other contexts [19, 30].
The Zero-Flow test reveals several problems with the op-
tical flow networks. First, the networks (FlowNetC, PWC-
Net) are not spatially invariant. In the case of zero motion,
the activation maps of the network vary spatially across the
whole image even without the adversarial patch. Second,
the pyramid networks predict large motion in coarser lev-
els flow<5,4> irrespective of the presence or absence of
the patch. Finally, the deconvolution layers lead to an am-
plification of the responses and checkerboard artifacts. The
attacks exploit these weaknesses and amplify them, degrad-
Input corr conv3 1 conv4 conv5 conv6 flow6 decon5 flow5 decon4 flow4 decon3 flow3 decon2 predict
Mean 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Mean 0.1 6.6 50.3 98.3 196.5 464.9 1015.8 825.0 3035.6 717.8 2491.1 316.1 668.2 78.6
FlowNetC
Input corr6 flow6 upfeat6 corr5 flow5 upfeat5 corr4 flow4 upfeat4 corr3 flow3 upfeat3 corr2 flow2
Mean 0.0 12.2 4.4 0.3 250.9 157.3 0.0 31.1 83.0 0.0 1.5 14.5 0.0 0.0
Mean 0.00 12.2 4.4 0.2 38.2 134.92 0.04 2.4 62.6 0.01 0.1 13.8 0.00 0.02
PWC-Net
Figure 6. Visualization of Feature Maps. Average norm of feature maps as we move deeper through the network. Each image is
normalized independently for contrast and scaled to the same size. Mean refers to average norm of the feature maps.
Figure 7. Real World Attacks on FlowNetC. Top: The presence
of a printed adversarial patch visible in the centre of the image
significantly degrades the optical flow predictions. Bottom: As the
patch is covered by the subject, the effect of the patch vanishes.
ing predictions. In the Supplementary Material, we show
additional visualizations of feature maps (from FlowNet2
and Back2Future).
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6. Discussion
We have shown that patch attacks generalize to state-of-
the-art optical flow networks and can considerably impact
the performance of optical flow systems that use deep neural
networks. The patch attacks are invariant to translation and
small changes in scale and orientation of the patch. Learn-
ing patches for larger changes in scale and orientation is
computationally costly. Nevertheless, it is possible to repli-
cate the attacks with real printed patterns.
Small adversarial patches cause large errors even in
remote regions with encoder-decoder networks (FlowNet,
FlowNet2) while spatial pyramid networks (SpyNet, PWC-
Net, Back2Future) are not strongly affected. Classical ap-
proaches are also robust to these attacks. This indicates that
incorporating classical ideas such as image pyramids and
correlations into architectures makes models more robust.
In our analysis, we observed the influence of such
patches on feature maps in encoder-decoder as well as
spatial pyramid networks. We also note that this results
from inherent spatially variant properties of the optical flow
networks. This indicates that convolutions alone are not
enough to enforce spatial invariance in these networks.
Finally, independent of the attacks, the Zero-Flow test
provides a novel approach to identify problems in deep flow
networks. It reveals the internal network behaviour which
may be useful to improve the robustness of flow networks.
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Appendices
A. Appendix
This supplementary document provides additional re-
sults on White-box and Black-box attacks as well as an
analysis of FlowNet2 [13] and Back2Future [15] under the
Zero-Flow test. In the video 1, we show real world attacks
using a printed patch placed in the environment.
A.1. White-box Attacks
Additional qualitative results for White-box attacks us-
ing patches of size 51 × 51 and 102 × 102 are shown in
Figure 8 and Figure 9, respectively. We observe that the ef-
fect of the patch is more prominent with larger patch sizes.
In agreement with the main paper, we note that spatial pyra-
mid architectures are more robust, as compared to encoder-
decoder architectures.
A.2. Black-box Attacks
The universal patch is shown in Figure 10. Table 4 shows
the performance of optical flow methods when the adversar-
ial patch has zero motion w.r.t. the camera. In comparison
to the moving Black-box attacks considered in the main pa-
per, we observe similar effects on all networks and base-
lines with the adversarial patch. While encoder-decoder
networks are strongly affected by the attacks, spatial pyra-
mid networks and classical methods are more robust.
In Figures 11 - 17 we show some additional qualitative
results for the Black-box attack with patches moving ac-
cording to the scene as described in the main paper. These
examples demonstrate the feasibility of such attackes in the
real world. In Figure 12, for instance, the patch is attached
to and moves with a traffic sign, while Figures 13, 16 illus-
trate cases when a patch is printed on a wall and a car.
Evaluation without considering the Patch Region. We
also evaulated the effect of the patch without considering
the patch region. In case of Black-box attacks (Table 5)
the flow outside of the patch region has a similar level of
degradation as our results considering the patch region. The
unattacked results only show minimal changes below the
1http://flowattack.is.tue.mpg.de/
Unattacked Attacked
EPE EPE Rel
FlowNet2 [13] 11.90 30.99 +160 %
PWCNet [28] 11.03 11.16 +1 %
FlowNetC [8] 14.56 77.78 +434 %
SpyNet [20] 20.26 20.65 +2 %
Back2Future [15] 17.49 17.76 +2 %
Epic Flow [23] 4.52 4.57 +1 %
LDOF [6] 9.20 9.30 +1 %
Table 4. Black-box Attacks. Attacks on different optical flow
methods using a universal patch that is static w.r.t. the camera.
Methods below the line were not used for training the patch.
Unattacked Attacked
W Patch W/O Patch W Patch W/O Patch
FlowNetC 14.56 14.56 86.12 80.69
PWCNet 11.03 11.03 11.01 11.08
FlowNet2 11.90 11.90 36.13 34.18
SpyNet 20.26 20.26 20.39 20.50
Back2Future 17.49 17.49 17.44 17.59
Table 5. Black-box Attacks. Comparison of the evaluation results
with and without considering the attacking patch region.
second decimal place because of the small patch size (≈
1%).
A.3. Zero-Flow Test
We show feature map visualizations for FlowNet2 and
Back2Future under the Zero-Flow test in Figures 18 and 19
respectively. We note that the feature maps of FlowNet2
are not spatially invariant, which is consistant with other
networks examined in Section 5 of the main paper. The
stacked FlowNetS (part of FlowNet2) seems to be less vul-
nerable to the adversarial patch as compared to FlowNetC
(part of FlowNet2). We also observe that the fusion part of
FlowNet2 dramatically amplifies the degradations in opti-
cal flow predictions. The deconvolution layers show similar
checkerboard artifacts as FlowNetC and PWC-Net analysed
in Section 5 of the main paper.
For Back2Future, we note that, although the feature
maps are not spatially invariant, their magnitude remains
small irrespective of the presence or absence of the adver-
sary. Interestingly, Back2Future gives reasonable flow pre-
dictions at coarser levels of the pyramid unlike PWC-Net,
even though they share a common architecture.
We note that the problem of spatially variant feature
maps continue across all the examined networks, along with
the checkerboard artifacts.
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Figure 8. White-box Attacks on all networks using 51x51 patches.
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Figure 9. White-box Attacks on all networks using 102x102 patches.
Figure 10. “Universal” Patch obtained by optimizing over FlowNet2 and PWCNet. Patch is enlarged for visualization.
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Figure 11. Black-box Attacks. Universal patch trained on FlowNet2 and PWC-Net used on all approaches. For this evaluation, we move
the patch according to the static scene.
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Figure 12. Black-box Attacks. Universal patch trained on FlowNet2 and PWC-Net used on all approaches. For this evaluation, we move
the patch according to the static scene.
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Figure 13. Black-box Attacks. Universal patch trained on FlowNet2 and PWC-Net used on all approaches. For this evaluation, we move
the patch according to the static scene.
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Figure 14. Black-box Attacks. Universal patch trained on FlowNet2 and PWC-Net used on all approaches. For this evaluation, we move
the patch according to the static scene.
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Figure 15. Black-box Attacks. Universal patch trained on FlowNet2 and PWC-Net used on all approaches. For this evaluation, we move
the patch according to the static scene.
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Figure 16. Black-box Attacks. Universal patch trained on FlowNet2 and PWC-Net used on all approaches. For this evaluation, we move
the patch according to the static scene.
Inp
uts
/ G
T
Flo
wN
etC
Flo
wN
et2
Spy
Net
PW
C-N
et
Bac
k2F
utu
re
Epi
c F
low
LD
OF
Unattacked Flow Attacked Flow Difference
Figure 17. Black-box Attacks. Universal patch trained on FlowNet2 and PWC-Net used on all approaches. For this evaluation, we move
the patch according to the static scene.
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Figure 18. Zero-Flow Test. Feature maps of Flownet2 under the Zero-Flow test. Top to bottom, we show rows corresponding to FlowNetC,
FlowNetS, FlowNetS, FlowNetSD and FlowNet Fusion that constitute FlowNet2.
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Figure 19. Zero-Flow Test. Feature maps of Back2Future under Zero-Flow test. Top to bottom, we show rows corresponding to forward
and backward parts of Back2Future in a multi-frame set up.
